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n 12 October 2006, the French 
General Assembly adopted a 
proposal for a law intending to 
penalise the denial of the existence of 
the Armenian genocide (Proposition de 
Loi tendant à réprimer la contestation 
de l’existence du genocide arménien).
1 
While the law remains currently 
submerged in the French decision-
making process, and will need the 
approval of the Senate and the final 
signature by the President of the 
Republic before its formal adoption,
2 it 
has already provoked a cascade of 
reactions at national and EU level. 
The draft law is a follow-up to a 
previous law from 2001 which publicly 
declared France’s recognition of the 
Armenian genocide in 1915.
3 The new 
initiative, however, goes much further. 
Art. 1 proposes the criminalisation of 
the act of denial of the Armenian 
genocide,
4 and provides that those 
                                                  
1 Retrievable from http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr and reproduced in Annex 1. 
2 According to the electronic journal Turkish 
Daily News, President Chirac has expressed 
some regrets about the draft law to his 
counterpart Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, but it is not clear yet whether this 
sentiment is strong enough to lead him to 
refuse to sign the bill. See “Chirac says sorry 
to Turkey for ‘Genocide Law’”, 16 October 
2006 (www.turkishdailynews.com.tr). 
3 Loi no 2001-70 du 29 January 2001 relative à 
la reconnaissance du génocide arménien de 
1915, J.O. n° 25, 30 January 2001. 
4 Art. 1 of the proposal states that « La loi n° 
2001-70 du 29 janvier 2001 relative à la 
reconnaissance du génocide arménien de 1915 
est complétée par un article ainsi rédigé: 
« Art. 2. - Sont  punis  des  peines prévues par 
l'article 24 bis de la loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la 
liberté de la presse ceux qui auront contesté, 
par un des moyens énoncés à l'article  23 de 
ladite loi, l'existence du génocide arménien de 
1915.  » «  Les modalités de poursuite et de 
répression de l'infraction définie par l'alinéa 
précédent sont soumises aux dispositions du 
denying the existence of the genocide 
would be subject to a punishment of 
one-year imprisonment and/or a fine of 
€45,000.
5 What are the political and 
legal implications of this Proposition de 
Loi  at EU level? In fact, the French 
proposal may raise a number of 
politically sensitive questions related to 
the European integration processes of 
enlargement, and particularly the 
current status of negotiations with 
Turkey. Further, the draft law might 
also present some legal transnational 
issues concerning the progressive 
establishment of a European Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) 
in the EU. 
Implications for 
Enlargement and Turkey 
Although the initiative can be 
interpreted as being motivated solely by 
                                                         
chapitre  V de la loi du 29  juillet  1881 
précitée. » « L'article 65-3 de la même loi est 
applicable. » 
5 Art. 24 of the Loi sur la Liberté de la Presse, 
says that «  Ceux qui, par l'un des moyens 
énoncés à l'article 23, auront provoqué à la 
discrimination, à la haine ou à la violence à 
l'égard d'une personne ou d'un groupe de 
personnes à raison de leur origine ou de leur 
appartenance ou de leur non-appartenance à 
une ethnie, une nation, une race ou une 
religion déterminée, seront punis d'un an 
d'emprisonnement et de 45000 euros d'amende 
ou de l'une de ces deux peines seulement ». 
domestic French political considerations 
prior to the upcoming national 
elections, its repercussions clearly go 
beyond France to involve the whole of 
the EU and its relationship with Turkey. 
This point was made in fact by Olli 
Rehn, European Commissioner for 
Enlargement, when he remarked in the 
wake of the vote in the French 
Parliament that “the French law on the 
Armenian genocide is of course a 
matter for French lawmakers, but there 
is a lot at stake for the European Union 
as well, and the decision may have very 
serious consequences for EU-Turkey 
relations”.
6 
It should be noted first of all, that 
France is not the only country to have 
placed this issue on its internal political 
agenda. A similar trend is also recently 
observed in the Netherlands prior to its 
national elections. In a similar vein, the 
European Parliament has not been aloof 
from the debate. The recent attempt to 
make the recognition of Armenian 
genocide an official criterion for 
Turkey’s accession to the EU in the 
European Parliament’s Eurlings Report 
was only averted in the last minute prior 
to the report’s adoption.
7 Similarly, a 
                                                  
6 “Rehn warns France against adopting 
Armenian genocide law”, EU Observer, 10 
October 2006. 
7 European Parliament, Report on Turkey’s 
Progress towards Accession, 13.9.2006, 
Rapporteur: Camiel Eurlings. 
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legal challenge was undertaken before 
the European Court of First Instance in 
Luxembourg by two individuals seeking 
compensation for the harm caused to 
them by recognition of Turkey’s status 
as a candidate for accession to the EU, 
although that State had refused to 
acknowledge the Armenian genocide. 
Without getting deep into the real 
discussion behind the case, the Court 
found the claims for compensation 
manifestly unfounded.
8 This decision 
was later reconfirmed by the European 
Court of Justice on 29 October 2004.
9 
The fact that this highly sensitive issue 
is now being used both in the domestic 
and in the European sphere for political 
purposes is in fact having severe 
repercussions not only for the EU’s 
relations with Turkey, but also for the 
EU’s own reputation as a credible 
international institution that stands by 
its own Kantian ideals of ‘doing as you 
would be done by’. The EU has long 
been applying a strict policy of 
‘conditionality’ to Turkey, and rightly 
so, regarding its record of 
democratisation with a particular 
emphasis on freedom of expression, 
which remains one of the major soft 
spots in the reform trajectory of the 
country. Freedom of expression is now 
one of the core areas over which there is 
the most intense struggle between the 
reformers and the conservative forces in 
the country. Through loopholes in the 
legal system (such as the infamous 
Article 301 of the Penal Code) and in 
coalition with certain veto-players in the 
judicial establishment, the reform 
resistant forces are struggling to reverse 
the democratic tide in Turkey. The 
struggle becomes fiercer as the 
democratic sphere widens in the 
country. One incident in which this 
struggle was clearly manifested 
concerned the holding of a conference 
in Turkey on the Armenian question in 
2005. What seemed to be unthinkable in 
the Turkish context just a few years ago 
was realised, despite the attempts to 
stop it. Hence the issue recently began 
                                                  
8 Case T-346/03, Krikorian et al. v. European 
Paliamente et al., Order of the Court of First 
Instance, 17 December 2003, 
9 Case C-18/04 P, Krikorian et al. v. European 
Parliament et al., European Court of Justice, 
29 October 2004. See also Case C-18/04, P(R), 
Krikorian et al. v. European Parliament et al., 
European Court of Justice,  13 September 
2004. 
to be discussed openly in the public 
sphere with dissenting voices 
questioning the official legacy of 
‘forgetting’ the past initiated in the 
1920s.  
While Turkey is still far from having 
reached a societal consensus based on a 
full-fledged debate on the issue, the fact 
that there is an ongoing discussion 
suggests that there is indeed a strong 
possibility for a closure of this issue in 
the longer run with the deepening of the 
democratic process in Turkey. Actions 
such as the French draft law or the 
attempts to make recognition of 
Armenian genocide a formal EU 
criterion for Turkey’s membership only 
hamper the reformists’ power vis-à-vis 
the conservative and nationalist 
establishment in Turkey by blocking a 
healthy progress of societal 
reconciliation in its early stages. 
Moreover, it strengthens the already-
rising levels of eurosceptism in the 
country by giving the impression that 
freedom of speech is a matter for 
candidate states only, whereas it can be 
curtailed by the state in the member 
countries. This helps to further damage 
the credibility of the Union in its 
enlargement policy which is already 
clouded by debates over the ‘absorption 
capacity’ and the final frontiers of the 
EU. 
Implications for the 
European Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice 
a. National solo-runs in criminal 
law and the European arrest 
warrant 
The French initiative will potentially 
raise some open questions as to 
practicalities linked with judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters in the 
EU. In the event that the proposal 
becomes formally ‘law’, it will then 
provide an interesting case for the 
applicability of one of the most famous 
and first outcomes of the nascent 
common European judicial area, i.e. the 
European Arrest Warrant (EAW).
10 
                                                  
10 For more information about the European 
Arrest Warrant, see Elspeth Guild (ed.), 
Constitutional Challenges to the European 
Arrest Warrant, Series on A Challenge for 
European Law: The Merging of Internal and 
External Security Centre for Migration Law, 
Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, and 
Radboud University of Nijmegen, 2006. 
Would, for example, Spain be obliged 
to surrender a Spanish national to face 
trial in France for questioning the 
Armenian genocide in a private 
discussion during a trip to Paris?  
According to Art. 2 of the Framework 
Decision on the European Arrest 
Warrant 2002/584,
11 there are some 32 
offences that shall lead to surrender ipso 
facto, without the need to check the 
existence of double criminality. The 
principle of double criminality means 
that for the legal surrender of a suspect, 
the alleged crime needs to be 
considered ‘punishable’ in both the 
issuing and the executing state. Among 
this list of serious crimes there is one 
qualified as “racism and xenophobia”. 
Whether the public denial of the 
Armenian genocide by the Spanish 
national could fall within this category 
is very much open to interpretation. 
However, even if the seriousness of 
such an act could potentially be 
qualified as “racism and xenophobia”, 
the principle of double criminality 
would still apply. Art. 24 bis of the Law 
on Freedom of Press (Loi Gayssot or 
Loi sur la liberté de la presse, 29 July 
1881) stipulates that the punishment 
would consist of one year imprisonment 
and/or a fine of €45,000. According to 
the Framework Decision on the EAW, 
the double criminality check is excluded 
only if the criminal offence is 
punishable with imprisonment of at 
least three years. Therefore, as long as 
no other member state introduces 
similar legislation or the French 
legislature significantly increases the 
punishment, it is unlikely that the 
surrender of a suspected criminal 
according to the potential new French 
law would ever happen. 
b. Fundamental rights and the 
aim to punish an opinion 
The initiative has been subject to 
criticism based on its potential lack of 
compatibility with fundamental rights 
as enshrined in European human rights 
laws, in particular, Art. 10 of the 
                                                  
11 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA 
of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between 
Member States, Official Journal L 190, 
18.07.2002. France’s Draft Law on the Armenian Genocide | 3 
European Convention of Human 
Rights:
12 
Everybody has the right to freedom of 
expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive 
and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers. 
Some would argue that the proposal 
undermines freedom of expression 
because the mere act of contesté, or 
denial of the existence of the genocide 
will be penalized by this law. In 
addition, the legal term contesté as used 
in the proposal may be qualified as 
leaving too much room for 
interpretation as to the nature of the 
violation. This flexibility may lead to 
confrontations about the exact 
demarcation of the right to freedom of 
expression and the denial of the 
genocide as criminal act.  
Does the initiative – if turned into law – 
violate freedom of expression? The 
question cannot be answered as easily 
as it might seem at first sight. As with 
nearly all human rights, freedom of 
expression is also subject to certain 
limitations. Moreover, the French draft 
on the Armenian genocide is not the 
first law penalising a specific opinion 
standing in reference to certain 
historical facts. Several European 
countries have adopted criminal laws 
that punish denial of the Holocaust. 
This is the case not only in Germany 
and Austria, but also in Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, 
Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Lithuania, Romania and also in France. 
This finding shall not imply that the 
Holocaust and the Armenian genocide 
are similar or even comparable, but it 
demonstrates that the criminalisation of 
a specific opinion is nothing new or 
revolutionary, neither in France nor in 
quite a number of other member states. 
With regard to the laws against denying 
the Holocaust, there is furthermore a 
large consensus among juridical bodies 
and courts – at national, European and 
UN levels – that they are consistent 
with fundamental rights. In a long-
established line of cases, the former 
European Commission of Human 
Rights considered Holocaust denial an 
abuse of freedom of expression. 
                                                  
12 And also Art. 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Denying the Holocaust – in the 
Strasbourg-based Commission’s view – 
aims at promoting ideas contrary to the 
text and the spirit of the European 
Convention. Consequently it denied the 
protection provided for in Art. 10.
13 The 
European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg has subsequently followed 
this approach.
14 At the UN level, the 
Human Rights Committee in 1996 
considered the application of the French 
law criminalising Holocaust denial in 
one specific case as compatible with 
Art. 19 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.
15 
Again, there exist significant 
differences between the Holocaust and 
the Armenian genocide. Whether these 
differences are significant enough to 
come to a different conclusion on the 
compatibility of the French draft law 
with human rights obligations will 
eventually be for the courts to decide. A 
first and preliminary conclusion on the 
legal implications of the draft, however, 
is that the criminalisation of a certain 
opinion towards historical facts as such 
does not per se and automatically 
constitute a violation of fundamental 
rights, and in particular the freedom of 
expression. 
Nevertheless, should the draft 
eventually become law, it might not 
take too long before the European Court 
of Human Rights will find itself in the 
dilemma of deciding on this highly 
sensitive issue. It has to be kept in mind 
that according to the Convention, not 
only a sentenced individual would be 
able to bring the matter before the 
Court, but also any other of the High 
Contracting Parties, including Turkey. 
It seems unlikely that the French 
General Assembly is aware of the 
political impact and damage that could 
be inflicted from a potential case of 
Turkey vs. France on the Armenian 
                                                  
13 See, inter alia, F.P. v. Germany, no. 
19459/92, Commission decision of 29 March 
1993;  Honsik v. Austria, no. 25062/94, 
Commission decision of 18 October 1995; 
Marais v. France, no. 31159/96, Commission 
decision of 24 June 1996; Nachtmann v. 
Austria, no. 36773/97, Commission decision 
of 9 September 1998. 
14  Garaudy v. France (dec.), no. 65831/01, 
ECHR 2003-IX; Witzsch v. Germany (dec.), 
no. 7485/03, decision of 13 December 2005. 
15 Faurisson v. France, Communication No. 
550/1993, views adopted on 8 November 
1996, UN Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993, 16 
December 1996. 
genocide law being brought before the 
Court in Strasbourg – regardless of 
what the Court’s final decision might 
be. 
Conclusions 
The French draft proposal illustrates 
how national measures of this type can 
have substantial political and legal 
implications at EU level. A legislative 
initiative, carried out by a relatively 
small number of local politicians and 
quite obviously launched to serve 
domestic strategic and political 
interests, turns out to have direct 
repercussions in the European 
dimension. 
Although the mere legal consequences 
for the European Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice would – so far – 
not be as significant as some would say, 
the political impact and negative 
consequences on the enlargement 
process and EU relations with Turkey 
cannot be underestimated.  
Regarding the EU’s enlargement policy, 
it strengthens the perception that there 
exist double standards of morality in 
Europe, one for candidates countries 
and another for the EU member states 
where their own controversial history is 
– only too often – consensually buried 
without ever becoming a subject of any 
substantial debate in any of these 
countries. Regarding relations with 
Turkey, the problem is two-fold: One is 
the strengthening of the belief in the 
country that Europe significantly lacks 
the amount of goodwill towards Turkey, 
fuelling nationalist reactions; and the 
other perhaps even more important is its 
weakening effect on the power of the 
reformist and progressive forces in the 
country, in a way that could endanger 
the EU’s very own success in fostering 
democratic change in Turkey. 
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Annex 1 
 
PROPOSITION DE LOI 
ADOPTÉE PAR L'ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE 
EN PREMIÈRE LECTURE, 
tendant à réprimer la contestation de l'existence 
du génocide arménien. 
 
Article 1
er 
La loi n° 2001-70 du 29 janvier 2001 relative à la reconnaissance du génocide arménien de 1915 est complétée par un article 
ainsi rédigé : 
« Art. 2. - Sont punis des peines prévues par l'article 24 bis de la loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse ceux qui auront 
contesté, par un des moyens énoncés à l'article 23 de ladite loi, l'existence du génocide arménien de 1915. 
« Les modalités de poursuite et de répression de l'infraction définie par l'alinéa précédent sont soumises aux dispositions du 
chapitre V de la loi du 29 juillet 1881 précitée. 
« L'article 65-3 de la même loi est applicable. » 
Article 2 (nouveau) 
La loi n° 2001-70 du 29 janvier 2001 précitée est complétée par un article 3 ainsi rédigé : 
« Art. 3. - Toute association régulièrement déclarée depuis au moins cinq ans à la date des faits, qui se propose, par ses statuts, 
de défendre les intérêts moraux et l'honneur des victimes du génocide arménien peut exercer les droits reconnus à la partie 
civile en ce qui concerne l'infraction prévue par le premier alinéa de l'article 2. » 
Article 3 (nouveau) 
Dans le premier alinéa de l'article 24 bis de la loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse, le mot : « sixième » est remplacé 
par le mot : « huitième ». 
 
***************** 
 
Annex 2 
 
LOI du 29 juillet 1881 
Loi sur la liberté de la presse, version consolidée au 19 avril 2006 (Loi Gayssot) 
 
Article 24 bis :  
Modifié par Loi n°92-1336 du 16 décembre 1992 art. 247 (JORF 23 décembre 1992 en vigueur le 1er mars 1994). 
Seront punis des peines prévues par le sixième alinéa de l'article 24 ceux qui auront contesté, par un des moyens énoncés à 
l'article 23, l'existence d'un ou plusieurs crimes contre l'humanité tels qu'ils sont définis par l'article 6 du statut du tribunal 
militaire international annexé à l'accord de Londres du 8 août 1945 et qui ont été commis soit par les membres d'une 
organisation déclarée criminelle en application de l'article 9 dudit statut, soit par une personne reconnue coupable de tels crimes 
par une juridiction française ou internationale. 
Le tribunal pourra en outre ordonner: 1° L'affichage ou la diffusion de la décision prononcée dans les conditions prévues par 
l'article 131-35 du code pénal. 
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